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Abstract. For the time being, mobile devices employ implicit authen-
tication mechanisms, namely, unlock patterns, PINs or biometric-based
systems such as fingerprint or face recognition. While these systems are
prone to well-known attacks, the introduction of an explicit and unob-
trusive authentication layer can greatly enhance security. In this study,
we focus on deep learning methods for explicit authentication based on
motion sensor signals. In this scenario, attackers could craft adversarial
examples with the aim of gaining unauthorized access and even restrain-
ing a legitimate user to access his mobile device. To our knowledge, this
is the first study that aims at quantifying the impact of adversarial at-
tacks on machine learning models used for user identification based on
motion sensors. To accomplish our goal, we study multiple methods for
generating adversarial examples. We propose three research questions
regarding the impact and the universality of adversarial examples, con-
ducting relevant experiments in order to answer our research questions.
Our empirical results demonstrate that certain adversarial example gen-
eration methods are specific to the attacked classification model, while
others tend to be generic. We thus conclude that deep neural networks
trained for user identification tasks based on motion sensors are subject
to a high percentage of misclassification when given adversarial input.
Keywords: adversarial attacks · adversarial examples · signal process-
ing · motion sensors · user authentication · convolutional neural networks
1 Introduction
Nowadays, usage of mobile devices has grown exponentially, becoming the first
choice for most users. Since personal devices allow manipulation and access to
private data, security is one of the most important factors to consider. Whereas
all operating systems and applications allow for standard security configura-
tion, such as unlock patterns, PINs or facial recognition, it is well known that
they are prone to attacks such as smudge [1], reflection [39,41] and video cap-
ture attacks [31,32,40]. With the advancement of technology, different sensors
were introduced in mobile devices, among others being motion sensors. Recent
works [2,5,7,24,34,36] proposed continuous and unobtrusive authentication sys-
tems that use motion sensors, such as the gyroscope and the accelerometer, to
silently identify users, employing machine learning models, e.g. convolutional
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neural networks. Unobtrusive authentication methods, based on motion sensor
data, are best used for enhancing implicit authentication systems (such as facial
detection algorithms and fingerprint scanners). Due to recent scientific progress,
implicit methods require fewer steps for the registration phase. As shown in
literature [2], machine learning models based on motion sensor data are great
candidates for the aforementioned process, taking into consideration their capa-
bility to register users in as less as 20 steps.
In this study, our objectives are (i) to determine if adversarial examples can
be crafted for deep learning models based on motion sensor signals, and (ii)
to evaluate the impact and the universality of adversarial examples for deep
learning models based on motion sensor signals. In an adversarial setting, data
samples are crafted by an attacker and fed as input to a classifier, with the aim of
inducing a different output, other than the expected label. Although deep neural
networks used in image recognition and computer vision tasks are known to be
prone to adversarial attacks [10,13,20], to our knowledge, there is no research
conducted on deep neural networks trained on motion signals collected from
mobile devices. Therefore, we are the first to experiment with various adversarial
attack generation methods on different neural network architectures, that are
trained to identify users based on motion sensor signals. Within this frame of
reference, we seek to gather empirical evidence on how different neural networks
architectures are affected by the generated adversarial examples. Our approach
is to employ convolutional neural models trained for user identification [2], using
samples from HMOG data set [34]. HMOG contains samples recorded during
screen tap gestures, from 50 users, while sitting. Samples include values collected
from the accelerometer and gyroscope, each providing data points on 3-axis,
namely (x, y, z). We convert each signal into a gray-scale image by repeating the
six one-dimensional signals, using an altered version of de Brujin sequences [27],
as explained in [2]. Rauber et al. [28] released a Python-based toolbox used for
model robustness benchmarking, called Foolbox. We use the built-in Foolbox
attack strategies to generate adversarial examples for our convolutional neural
networks.
In summary, our aim is to answer the following research questions (RQs) in
the context of adversarial example generation on motion sensor data:
– RQ1: Can we generate adversarial examples to attack deep learning models
for user identification based on motion sensor data?
– RQ2: Are the adversarial examples universal or specific to certain neural
architectures?
– RQ3: What generative methods produce the most damaging adversarial at-
tacks?
We organize the rest of this paper as follows. We discuss related work in
Section 2. We present the machine learning models and adversarial generation
techniques in Section 3. We describe the experiments with adversarial attacks in
Section 4. Finally, we draw our conclusions in Section 5.
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2 Related Work
There are many works that conducted research on user identification on mobile
devices using motion sensor data [3,6,7,8,14,18,19,24,29,30,34,36,37,38]. Among
the broad range of explored methods, some rely on voice and accelerometer-
based user recognition [37], while others perform human movement tracking
based on motion sensors [34]. The most recent and best-performing approaches
are based on deep learning [2,24]. So far, researchers explored recurrent neural
networks [24] and convolutional neural networks [2]. However, none of the previ-
ous works investigated the possibility of generating adversarial attacks by adding
indistinguishable perturbations to the motion signals recorded on mobile devices.
In this paper, we focus on convolutional neural networks (CNNs), which were
shown to outperform Long Short-Term Memory networks in the recent work of
Benegui et al. [2]. The approach proposed in [2] consists in converting motion
sensor signals into images that are provided as input to a convolutional neural
network. Although CNN models provide outstanding results on various computer
vision tasks [11,15,16,33], some recent studies [9,10,23,26] showed that adversar-
ial examples can generate sizeable misclassification error rates, indicating that
CNNs are not robust to adversarial attacks. For instance, Chen et al. [10] showed
that adversarial attacks induce an error rate of 95.80% in CNNs trained for im-
age classification. Simple black-box tools used to generate adversarial samples,
e.g. Foolbox [28], represent practical ways of crafting attacks without requiring
any prior knowledge related to the attacked model [23]. Papernot et al. [26] noted
that generator models for adversarial examples can be universal, i.e. examples
optimized on a classification model can easily produce misclassification errors for
other classification models with different architectures. We note that the afore-
mentioned studies targeted neural networks for objects and image classification
problems. To our knowledge, we are the first to study adversarial attacks on
neural networks used in user identification tasks based on motion sensor signals
recorded on mobile devices.
3 Method
3.1 Convolutional Neural Networks
With the aim of answering our research questions, we implement four CNN mod-
els, with the same design and configuration proposed by Benegui et al. [2], start-
ing from a shallow 4-layer CNN architecture and increasing the depth gradually
to 6 layers, 9 layers and 12 layers, respectively. Each model consists of differ-
ent convolutional (conv) layers followed by max pooling and fully-connected (fc)
layers. All layers are activated by Rectified Linear Units (ReLU) [22], except
for the classification layer. Each fc layer has a dropout rate of 0.4 [35] to pre-
vent overfitting. Max pooling layers have a pool size of 2 × 2 and are applied
at stride 2. Since our models are trained for multi-class classification, Softmax
activation is preferred in the last layer, since it outputs the probability of each
class. Network training is performed using the Adam optimizer [17] with the
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Fig. 1. An original and an adversarial example generated by the Boundary Attack. The
left-most image represents the original motion sensor signals. The second image is the
adversarial example. The right-most image depicts an exaggerated map of differences
between the original and the adversarial image. Best viewed in color.
categorical cross-entropy loss function. In all models, the final layer is composed
of 50 neurons, equal to the number of classes.
The 4-layer architecture is composed of 1 conv layer with 32 filters applied
at a stride of 1, followed by 2 fc layers and the softmax activation layer. In the
6-layer CNN, we employ 3 conv layers, 2 fc layers and one Softmax classification
layer. The third architecture, with a depth of 9 layers, is built as follows: 6
conv layers, 2 fc layers and the classification layer. Lastly, our 12-layer CNN
is composed of 9 conv layers, 2 fc layers and the Softmax classification layer.
While the four models share some architectural elements, each model is trained
independently, having no weights in common with any of the other models.
3.2 Adversarial Example Generation Strategies
Adversarial examples represent scarcely modified data samples that, when pro-
vided as input to neural networks, determine incorrect predictions. Starting from
the assumption that different methods of generating adversarial examples can
provide different results, we propose to experiment with four different gradient-
based or decision-based attack methods. The goal of crafting an adversarial
example from a real example is to produce a misclassification error, i.e. the
adversarial attack is about inducing incorrect predictions. This is achieved by
maximizing the categorical cross-entropy loss. In order to craft a realistic adver-
sarial example, we also aim at minimizing the mean squared error with respect
to the original example used as starting point for the optimization. Therefore,
our second goal is to create adversarial samples as similar as possible to the
originals. By jointly maximizing the categorical cross-entropy and minimizing
the mean squared error between two inputs (the original and the adversarial
example), we can obtain an adversarial example with a high percentage of simi-
larity to the original, unnoticeable for humans, that is wrongly classified by the
neural network. We note that the generator might not always converge to an
adversarial example having both properties, i.e. not all attacks are successful.
Next, we briefly present the considered attacks.
Boundary Attack. The Boundary Attack [4] method is a simple and efficient
attack that starts from a randomly generated perturbation vector. In each iter-
ation, the method regenerates the adversarial sample until the difference to the
original input becomes smaller, yet still recognized as adversarial, by minimizing
the L2-norm of perturbations. Figure 1 shows a comparison between an original
example and an adversarial example generated by the Boundary Attack.
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Fast Gradient Sign Attack. This attack perturbes the input sample given to
a classification model considering the gradient of the loss, gradually amplifying
the gradient magnitude until the model misclassifies the generated example [12].
DeepFool L2 Attack. Introduced by Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [21], the DeepFool
L2 attack takes an original sample and generates a perturbation vector that is
added to the adversarial sample. For each class, the algorithm computes the
smallest distance required to reach the class boundary using a linear classifier.
Once the smallest distance has been computed, a corresponding move towards
the direction of the class boundary is made. Using this attack, a perturbation
vector that misleads the classifier can be identified in as less as three iterations.
Jacobian-Based Saliency Map Attack. Papernot et al. [25] introduced a
targeted attack based on gradients, that computes a score, called the saliency
score, for each feature available in the original sample. The computations are
performed in an iterative manner. Therefore, in each iteration the saliency score
can change the prediction of the model from the original class to a different class.
4 Experiments
4.1 Data Set
We use the HMOG data set [34], which is composed of discrete signals, gathered
from the accelerometer and gyroscope motion sensors, while 50 users perform tap
gestures on a mobile device screen. While each user is performing a tap gesture,
signals are recorded for a period of 1.5 seconds, as follows: values are captured
starting with 0.5 seconds before the tap, continuing for another second after the
tap was performed. Sensor sample values are arranged on 3 spatial coordinates,
namely (x, y, z). Since the values are recorded at an approximate frequency of
100 Hz, we commonly obtain around 150 values for the signal corresponding to
one axis. For our experiments, we recorded signals associated with 200 gestures
per user, thus obtaining a data set of 10.000 samples (50 users × 200 samples).
For the training and evaluation process, we employ an 80%–20% train-test split,
hence, 160 samples per user are used for training, while the other 40 samples are
used for testing. Adopting a multi-class user identification model on the set of
users, we obtain 8.000 training samples and 2.000 test samples. The test samples
are used to generate adversarial examples. After the generative method reaches
a convergence point for each test sample, the generated adversarial examples are
fed into the neural models to reassess the performance of the user identification
models under adversarial attacks.
4.2 Evaluation metrics
In our experiments, we employ the misclassification error as evaluation metric.
Since adversarial samples are crafted to fool the deep CNNs, in an attempt to
make the models assign labels different from the expected ones, the goal of the
attack is to increase the misclassification rate. We also calculate the misclassifi-
cation error of the deep networks on the original test samples, thus providing a
measure of the impact of the adversarial attacks.
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4.3 Parameter Tuning and Implementation Details
Benegui et al. [2] described the optimal hyperparameters for the CNN models
trained on the HMOG data set. Hence, we employ the same hyperparameters,
obtaining similar results. The learning rate is 10−3 and the mini-batch size is 32.
Furthermore, we use dropout layers with a rate of 0.4 after each fully-connected
layer. We train each CNN model using the Adam optimizer [17] for a total of 50
epochs. We use the Foolbox library [28] to generate adversarial samples. Foolbox
provides out-of-the-box implementations for state-of-the-art gradient-based and
decision-based attacks. We employ the four example generation methods pre-
sented in Section 3 using the default Foolbox hyperparameters, except for the
Boundary Attack method, where we employ a batch size equal to 20 and run
the algorithm for a maximum of 5 iterations on each original sample.
4.4 Experimental Setup
After neural network training on 160 samples per user, the remaining 40 data
samples are used for both testing and adversarial generation. Since our data set
contains 50 users in total, we generate 2.000 adversarial samples (40 test sam-
ples × 50 users) with each generative method, namely the Fast Gradient Sign
Attack, the DeepFool L2 Attack, the Jacobian-Based Saliency Map Attack and
the Boundary Attack. Thus, we obtain a total of 8.000 adversarial examples. In
our experiments, we employ four CNN architectures of different depths, partic-
ularly of 4 layers, 6 layers, 9 layers and 12 layers. To answer RQ2, we test the
adversarial examples generated for one CNN model on the other CNN models.
Lastly, we explore an ensemble classification method, by combining all the
proposed CNNs through a weight voting scheme, using the classification accuracy
rates of the independent models as weights. In this context, an attack is universal
if the majority vote predicted by the ensemble is not equal to the ground-truth
label. Adversarial samples are given as input to the ensemble, with the aim of
further exploring their universality.
4.5 Results
In Table 1, we present the empirical results obtained by distinct neural network
architectures in the user identification task, under various adversarial attacks.
One by one, each CNN model is selected as the attacked model. Since we are
interested in the universality of the adversarial examples, we feed the adversarial
examples generated for a specific model to all other models. To allow a better es-
timation of the impact of each adversarial attack, we report the misclassification
error rates on the original test samples.
Adversarial examples optimized for the 4-layer CNN. We observe that,
when the attacks are designed for the 4-layer CNN model, the misclassification
rate for three of the attacks (DeepFool L2, Jacobian-Based Saliency Map and
Boundary) is 100%. The Fast Gradient Sign Attack induces a misclassification
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Table 1. Empirical results obtained by distinct neural network architectures under
various adversarial attacks, in the user identification task. The results are reported in
terms of the misclassification error (lower values indicate higher robustness to adver-
sarial attacks). The model for which the adversarial examples were generated is marked
with an asterisk.
Misclassification Error
Adversarial Generation Strategy 4-layer 6-layer 9-layer 12-layer
CNN CNN CNN CNN
None 8.25% 8.20% 4.45% 5.80%
Boundary Attack on 4-layer CNN 100.00%? 39.50% 34.60% 25.90%
DeepFool L2 Attack on 4-layer CNN 100.00%
? 6.45% 6.00% 6.50%
Gradient Sign Attack on 4-layer CNN 99.50%? 14.40% 11.55% 13.05%
Saliency Map Attack on 4-layer CNN 100.00%? 82.85% 60.80% 30.80%
Boundary Attack on 6-layer CNN 79.40% 100.00%? 48.60% 42.30%
DeepFool L2 Attack on 6-layer CNN 9.30% 100.00%
? 6.20% 8.00%
Gradient Sign Attack on 6-layer CNN 22.65% 99.95%? 16.90% 25.20%
Saliency Map Attack on 6-layer CNN 91.95% 100.00%? 66.55% 43.30%
Boundary Attack on 9-layer CNN 81.90% 67.10% 99.95%? 47.40%
DeepFool L2 Attack on 9-layer CNN 8.45% 5.25% 100.00%
? 8.85%
Gradient Sign Attack on 9-layer CNN 17.85% 17.90% 100.00%? 22.05%
Saliency Map Attack on 9-layer CNN 89.25% 85.55% 100.00%? 53.95%
Boundary Attack on 12-layer CNN 83.40% 72.05% 64.55% 100.00%?
DeepFool L2 Attack on 12-layer CNN 8.45% 5.30% 6.65% 100.00%
?
Gradient Sign Attack on 12-layer CNN 16.85% 18.20% 11.55% 99.8%?
Saliency Map Attack on 12-layer CNN 93.20% 89.35% 83.60% 100.00%?
rate of 99.50%. We thus conclude that the 4-layer CNN is not robust to adversar-
ial attacks optimized on itself. However, when we feed the adversarial examples
to deeper architectures, depending on the attack strategy, we observe that the
misclassification error varies considerably, attaining values between a minimum
of 6.00% and a maximum of 82.85%. In the cross-model evaluation, we note
that the DeepFool L2 Attack is not universal, the deeper CNNs being robust
to the examples generated by DeepFool L2. In terms of universality, the most
successful seems to be the Jacobian-Based Saliency Map Attack, although its ef-
fectiveness degrades as the CNN model under attack gets deeper. For example,
the Jacobian-Based Saliency Map Attack increases the missclasification error of
the 12-layer CNN from 5.80% to 30.80%, most of the attacks being rejected by
the CNN model.
Adversarial examples optimized for the 6-layer CNN. When the attacks
are specifically optimized for the 6-layer CNN, its misclassification error rates
are 100% or nearly 100%. Just as the 4-layer CNN, the 6-layer CNN is not
robust to adversarial examples optimized on itself. Except for the DeepFool L2
Attack, we observe that the adversarial examples increase the misclassification
error of the remaining architectures. The least affected model by the DeepFool
L2 Attack is the 9-layer CNN, attaining a misclassification error of 6.20%. For
the Boundary Attack, it seems that the impact of the adversarial examples is
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Table 2. Empirical results obtained by the CNN ensemble based on weighted majority
voting under various adversarial attacks, in the user identification task. The results are
reported in terms of the misclassification error (lower values indicate higher robustness
to adversarial attacks).
Adversarial Generation Strategy Misclassification Error of CNN Ensemble
None 2.45%
Boundary Attack on 4-layer CNN 24.50%
DeepFool L2 Attack on 4-layer CNN 2.79%
Gradient Sign Attack on 4-layer CNN 8.50%
Saliency Map Attack on 4-layer CNN 48.10%
Boundary Attack on 6-layer CNN 46.09%
DeepFool L2 Attack on 6-layer CNN 2.95%
Gradient Sign Attack on 6-layer CNN 15.04%
Saliency Map Attack on 6-layer CNN 59.15%
Boundary Attack on 9-layer CNN 59.25%
DeepFool L2 Attack on 9-layer CNN 3.10%
Gradient Sign Attack on 9-layer CNN 15.84%
Saliency Map Attack on 9-layer CNN 77.40%
Boundary Attack on 12-layer CNN 65.94%
DeepFool L2 Attack on 12-layer CNN 3.04%
Gradient Sign Attack on 12-layer CNN 11.05%
Saliency Map Attack on 12-layer CNN 86.75%
inversely proportional to the depth of the neural networks. The most effective
attack across all models seems to be the Jacobian-Based Saliency Map Attack.
For example, the 4-layers CNN gives a misclassification error of 91.95% when
it is attacked with the adversarial examples generated by the Jacobian-Based
Saliency Map method applied on the 6-layer CNN. An interesting observation
is that the adversarial examples optimized for the 6-layer CNN seem to have
a higher degree of universality than the adversarial examples optimized for the
4-layer CNN.
Adversarial examples optimized for the 9-layer CNN. The adversarial
examples generated for the 9-layer CNN are very effective on the 9-layer CNN,
just as we observed in the previous cases. Indeed, the misclassification error
rates are typically close to 100%, indicating that the 9-layer CNN is not robust
to adversarial examples. As we observed in the previous experiments, many of
the adversarial attacks designed for the 9-layer CNN raise the misclassification
error rates for the remaining models by considerable margins. The most affected
models seem to be the 4-layer CNN and the 6-layer CNN. Once again, the least
effective attack is the DeepFool L2 Attack, while the most effective one is the
Jacobian-Based Saliency Map Attack.
Adversarial examples optimized for the 12-layer CNN. So far, the most
robust CNN model, with respect to all the considered attacks, was the 12-layer
CNN. However, when the adversarial examples are specifically crafted for the
12-layer CNN, the model is no longer robust, attaining misclassification rates of
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100% or close. Furthermore, the impact of the adversarial examples generated
with the Jacobian-Based Saliency Map method on the shallower CNN models is
major. Indeed, the Jacobian-Based Saliency Map Attack induces misclassifica-
tion error rates between 83.60% for the 9-layer CNN and 93.20% for the 4-layer
CNN. On the other hand, the DeepFool L2 Attack is not effective.
Generic observations. Considering the overall results, we observe that the
adversarial examples generated using the Jacobian-Based Saliency Map are the
most effective across CNN models. In general, the attacks seem to have a higher
degree of universality as the adversarial examples are optimized for deeper net-
works. In the same time, it seems that the depth of the network under attack is
strongly correlated to the robustness to adversarial examples optimized on other
CNN models, i.e. deeper models are more robust. However, each CNN model can
be easily attacked when the adversarial examples are optimized on the respective
model, proving than no model is robust to targeted attacks. In this context, we
next seek to find out if an ensemble formed of the four CNN models is robust to
all adversarial attacks.
Adversarial attacks on CNN ensemble. In our last experiment, we feed the
adversarial examples to an ensemble of the four CNN models, presenting the
corresponding results in Table 2. First, we note the ensemble attains improved
results on original test samples, the error rate being 2% lower than that of
the best individual model, namely the 9-layer CNN. While DeepFool L2 and
Fast Gradient Sign do not seem to break the ensemble, it appears that the
CNN ensemble is not robust to the Boundary Attack and the Jacobian-Based
Saliency Map Attack. The misclassification error rates are typically higher as
the adversarial attacks are targeted on deeper and deeper networks. This is
consistent with the results presented in Table 1. We conclude that combining the
CNNs into an ensemble is not effective for blocking certain adversarial attacks.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we studied different methods of generating adversarial examples
for deep models trained on motion sensor signals. We conducted a series of user
identification experiments, considering different CNN architectures using both
original and adversarial examples. The evaluation led to conclusive empirical re-
sults, enabling us to answer the proposed research questions. We hereby conclude
our work by answering the research questions:
– RQ1: Can we generate adversarial examples to attack deep learning models
for user identification based on motion sensor data?
Answer: Generating adversarial attacks is possible, producing misclassifica-
tion error rates of nearly 100%, irrespective of the CNN architecture. The
answer to RQ1 is affirmative.
– RQ2: Are the adversarial examples universal or specific to certain neural
architectures?
Answer: After experimenting with four adversarial attack strategies, we ob-
served that some attacks are specific, namely the DeepFool L2 Attack and
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the Fast Gradient Sign Attack, and others are rather universal, namely the
Boundary Attack and the Jacobian-Based Saliency Map Attack. In conclu-
sion, it really depends on the attack strategy. It is perhaps important to
mention here that the degree of universality grows with the depth of the
target CNN used to optimize the adversarial examples.
– RQ3: What generative methods produce the most damaging adversarial at-
tacks?
Answer: All the consider adversarial attack methods induce misclassification
error rates of nearly 100% when the optimization and the evaluation is per-
formed on the same CNN model. However, considering the universality of
the attack strategies, the most damaging adversarial attack is definitely the
one based on the Jacobian-Based Saliency Map.
In summary, we conclude that deep neural networks for user identification
are affected by adversarial examples, even in the cross-model evaluation setting.
In most cases, the misclassification error rates grow by substantial margins.
In future work, we aim to design novel deep neural networks that are robust
to adversarial examples, perhaps by introducing a way to identify adversarial
examples.
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